Introduction
24 Good listeners must do some of what L. Waks (in preparation) calls ''apophatic'' listening, 25 opening the self to the other and holding one's own categories in abeyance. If a listener 26 reacts to another by immediately categorizing the experience and the information using 27 pre-existing categories, it is impossible to learn something genuinely new. In this article we 28 describe our own version of apophatic listening, which we have called ''direct 29 involvement'' (Michel and Wortham forthcoming), and we describe how one investment 30 bank socialized new members into being more directly involved and less self-involved. We
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78 cognition . We argue that listening is not only achieved through personal 79 discipline aimed at self-transformation, but also as a by-product of organizational 80 processes aimed at other goals. One can become a more or less self-involved listener by 81 virtue of participating in distinct types of organizational environments, without intending 82 or explicitly reflecting on these modes of listening. 83
In sketching answers to our research questions, the first section below reviews the 84 contrasting practices employed in the two banks. The following section describes how 85 these different practices affected the development of the participants, with a focus on their 86 differential ability to listen.
87 Reducing uncertainty at People Bank 88 Both banks faced a changing environment in the late 20th century, which increased the 89 uncertainty of a banker's job, as they had to attend to a wider range of sometimes 90 conflicting economic, legal, cultural, and accounting factors. The two banks responded to 91 this increased uncertainty in different ways. People Bank's work practices tried to reduce 92 uncertainty and simplify banker decision making. Organization Bank's practices tried to 93 amplify uncertainty so that the bankers could notice and use it, as described in the 94 following section. 95
People Bank reduced uncertainty through an integrated system of plans and roles. One 96 aspect of this system was that top management formulated strategies in the form of general 97 principles and that employees were assigned tasks in accordance with this strategy. For 98 example, when top management introduced a strategic focus on healthcare business, one 99 part of the investment banking division was restructured from a focus on products, such as 100 mergers and acquisitions or corporate finance, to a focus on industry groups, including 101 healthcare. This system influenced the daily work of the bankers, how they were trained, 102 assigned to roles and tasks, and evaluated. Bankers in the healthcare focus group, for 103 instance, were given lists of healthcare companies to call on and specific revenue goals on 104 which they were regularly reviewed and rewarded. 105
This integrated system reduced uncertainty, because bankers did not need to understand 106 the bank's external environment, or the fit of their transactions with that of bankers in other 107 groups. Each banker only needed to focus on one small piece of the bank's business, such 108 as the list of healthcare companies, and to satisfy a clear standard like an annual revenue 109 goal. This system reduced uncertainty by orienting bankers towards abstractions, toward 110 concepts that applied independently of concrete circumstances. People Bank's system did 111 not allow bankers to make decisions solely with reference to a concrete situation; they were 112 encouraged to judge the appropriateness of a decision based on its consistency with general 113 strategies and goals. 114
One illustration of the people-centric aspect of this system is that bankers were staffed 115 on projects to match their personal expertise. For example, when the bank received a 116 healthcare sell-side mandate, it staffed bankers with experience in both the healthcare 117 industry and sell-side assignments. This was an important part of the bank's business 118 model, which involved selling the knowledge of individual ''superstars.'' Client 119 presentation books, for instance, highlighted the relevant experience of individual bankers. 120 Also, individual bankers sought to cultivate a public profile by seeking opportunities to 121 speak to the press. They tried to attract the attention of potential clients, who often gave the 122 bank business under the condition that a particular banker works on a deal. This staffing
123 practice reduced banker uncertainty, because bankers only had to master a relatively 124 limited domain of knowledge.
125 Amplifying uncertainty at Organization Bank 126 People Bank believed that the bank's business was too uncertain for individual bankers to 127 comprehend and navigate. As a solution, it oriented bankers away from this uncertainty and 128 towards a limited number of abstract decision making standards. Organization Bank also 129 recognized that its business was highly uncertain. But it made the unusual choice to orient 130 bankers toward this uncertainty-thus amplifying it-such that bankers would notice and 131 use it better. Instead of orienting bankers to such abstractions as strategies, roles, and goals, 132 it withheld them. Bankers were not given plans or targets, and they were not referred to as 133 having identities as one kind of expert or another. The bankers consequently made 134 decisions with reference to the concrete details of specific situations. For example, 135 Organization Bank's top management did not design strategies, but executed deals like 136 other bankers. The bank did have strategies, but these were not typical top-down plans that 137 dictated what bankers at lower levels should do. Rather, they were bottom-up and 138 retrospective, emerging from the choices that bankers at lower levels had made in response 139 to noticing market opportunity: ''We looked back and noticed: 'Gee, we have a healthcare 140 strategy.''' Instead of telling bankers what to do, the bank guided bankers by continuously 141 making the consequences of their actions salient. For this purpose, bankers received an 142 enormous amount of information on a daily basis, including reports about the revenues 143 they generated, the cost of the resources they used, the time they were allocating to specific 144 types of transactions, and the deals they had lost to competitors. This information deluge 145 contrasted not only to People Bank's practices but also contradicted deeply held tenets of 146 cognitive organization theories, which recommend that organizations should reduce the 147 information that confronts decision-makers and give them interpretation guidelines. In 148 contrast, Organization Bank trusted bankers to react productively to often conflicting 149 imperatives and believed that the person who knows the most concrete detail would make 150 the best decision. 151
One illustration of Organization Banks more organization-centric approach is that it 152 staffed bankers purely based on availability versus based on their individual expertise. 153 When clients requested a particular banker to work on a deal, the banker who staffed 154 projects usually said: ''Our bankers are fungible.'' When one Organization Banker went on 155 vacation or was overloaded, other bankers could seamlessly substitute on projects. These 156 unexpected substitutions onto unfamiliar projects were one important source of persistent 157 uncertainty for bankers at all levels. This approach to staffing meant that bankers often had 158 to deal with situations for which they had not yet formed concepts that they could apply, 159 either because they were inexperienced or because the situations were inherently unpre-160 dictable. A People Bank VP noted that this was ''unthinkable'' at People Bank: ''It just 161 doesn't work that way. You can't replicate what your colleague knows at the drop of the 162 hat.'' Also, Organization Bank's client presentations primarily focused on the resources of 163 the bank. They did not make reference to the backgrounds of individual bankers. 164
In summary, the description of Organization Bank reveals practices that amplified 165 uncertainty and thereby prevented participants from approaching situations with a set of 166 abstract rules and concepts. Due to the absence of such general guidance, newcomers had 167 to attend keenly to the concrete guidance available in particular situations, including task Newcomers at People Bank and Organization Bank behaved in similar ways when they 178 entered the banks, which is evident that the differences in development described in this 179 section did not result from selection effects, but instead stemmed from the distinct 180 organizational practices at the two banks. Each set of newcomers identified strongly with 181 their bank. They displayed bank paraphernalia in their cube and at home, 195 One important practice through which People Bank reduced this uncertainty was assigning 196 bankers to organizational roles, such as analysts or associates, which were associated with 197 explicit behavioral expectations and which provided an identity. 198
Over the next two years, the People Bankers developed more elaborate concepts, 199 behavioral scripts, tastes, and narratives to represent themselves as members of their social 200 context. During the first six months, bankers learned the meaning of such social concepts, 201 but were not supposed to apply these concepts to themselves, because they were told that 202 this was a time of learning. As the bankers integrated the bank's concepts into their 203 identity, however, these social standards nonetheless became infused with personal 204 significance. This personal significance then influenced how bankers interpreted and acted 205 in situations. For example, bankers often stayed longer than needed at work, to fit in with 206 the hard-driving work-ethic: 
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212 self-reported stress levels rose from ''high'' to ''extremely high,'' revealing the terror they 213 felt at the prospect of failing on standards that they now considered part of their identities. 214 Since these identity standards became so significant to the bankers, and because bankers 215 used them so often to interpret situations, these standards eventually became activated 216 automatically-that is, without the bankers' knowledge or ability to control this 217 activation-even when standards were not relevant to a particular situation. For example, 218 because the People Bankers identified with being experts-which meant that they would 219 give advice to a client based on their superior knowledge-they often did not recognize 220 situations in which the client had superior knowledge. In these situations, the People 221 Bankers sometimes failed to ask questions of the client and acted with confidence on their 222 incorrect assumptions. This evidence indicates that People Bankers most often based their 223 actions on what was relevant to their identities. In doing so they often failed to notice what 224 was relevant to the situations they were acting in. The internalization of social standards 225 resulted in a highly charged, self-oriented psychological situation that prevented the 226 bankers from noticing and acting on cues in a specific social situation. In such examples of 227 identity induced involvement, behavior was relatively more determined by a banker's inner 228 mental resources-their habitual identity schema-and relatively less by available social 229 resources.
Participant transformation at Organization Bank
231
The work practices at Organization Bank, in contrast, encouraged in their participants a 232 more immediate or direct involvement. In this alternative, more concrete orientation that 233 enhanced participants' ability to listen, relevant concepts emerged more inductively, from 234 a relatively immediate or direct connection among the organization resources that together 235 produced particular solutions. While participants drew on their prior notions, they also 236 opened themselves to new understandings. 237
Identity development took place differently at Organization Bank. Like the People 238 Bankers, the Organization Bankers were assigned to roles. But these roles were mere 239 formalities. Role responsibilities were constantly over-ridden by changing task demands 240 and thus neither guided action nor served as a basis for self-definition. In general, the 241 bankers found it difficult to find basic principles of orientation: 242 I know that this ain't going to be 8-hour days. But, I mean, can you at least give me 243 some guidelines beyond that? Sometimes people work around the clock for weeks in 244 a row, 7 days a week. But then people also sometimes come to work at 1 pm, go to 245 the gym during all hours of the day, sometimes they don't show up at all because 246 they just decided that they had been working too hard and are taking a day off, and 247 then there is the Barney's warehouse sale when people are just out the door and come 248 back later with huge shopping bags, walking right by Joe [the head of the depart-249 ment].
250 When they asked senior bankers what made a banker successful, they usually heard that it 251 was ''task-orientation.'' We derived the analytic construct of direct involvement from this 252 task-orientation concept used by our participants. One VP explained that: ''Task-orienta-253 tion means that you do what needs to get done in the way most appropriate to the task at 254 hand.'' Task-orientation differed from the general standards at People Bank because it 255 pointed bankers to the needs of specific situations, as opposed to stable abstractions. But 256 the junior Organization Bankers initially misinterpreted task-orientation by judging it with
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257 reference to the banker who displayed this attribute. Their underlying question was: ''How 258 will I complete the tasks that are assigned to me?'' They tried to use their task performance 259 to demonstrate identity traits to themselves and others. For example, one junior banker 260 worked all night despite severe pneumonia and continued to work while vomiting blood. 261 The banker explained his behavior with a desire to ''prove myself and show that I can get 262 the task done.'' This behavior, although extreme, was similar to the junior People Bankers 263 who also prioritized identity concerns. 264
But while the People Bankers persisted in this pattern of behavior throughout our 265 observation period of two years, after about six months the Organization Bankers' focus 266 shifted to ''How will I complete the tasks that are assigned to me?''-emphasizing the 267 ''how'' instead of the ''I.'' They moved away from a concern with identity and towards a 268 concern with tasks. At this time, the Organization Bankers' self-reported stress level 269 dropped from ''extremely high'' (''these are the most grueling times of my life'') to 270 ''high'' (''intense but manageable''), reversing the change that we observed in the People 271 Bankers. According to the Organization Bankers, the pivotal experience that reduced their 272 stress level was that they were consistently able to complete the projects that were assigned 273 to them, regardless of their own amount of knowledge and skill, because the bank's 274 resources complemented their own resources. Whatever one banker did not know, he or she 275 could get from this resource pool.
276
You know, I eventually figured it out. This is not about me, it's not about how smart 277 I am. This is about what you can do when you pull extraordinary resources together. I 278 might not know whether the client should sell the business, spin it off, whatever. I 279 might not even be able to do half of the analyses that I am responsible for. But I can 280 still get it done and get it done well every single time because of the resources here.
281 Different bankers had the same insight because the bank's organizational processes 282 facilitated this particular insight. The bank did so not by circulating norms, rules, and 283 shared understandings and encouraging internalization-which is how culture normally 284 operates-but by blocking norms and rules, by foregrounding uncertainty, and not letting 285 junior bankers develop stable scripts and identities. 286 295 This quote shows that the Organization Bankers continued to experience high-task 296 uncertainty (''I don't have the answer'') but that their attitude towards this uncertainty had 297 changed. While they previously disguised their lack of knowledge to protect their identities 298 as competent bankers, they subsequently used it as a cue to guide data collection (''I ask 299 tons of questions''). They had to listen attentively in order to identify the relevant 300 organizational resources. In contrast, the People Bankers usually completed many different 301 analyses before a meeting and spent the meeting giving advice, as opposed to asking 302 questions and listening. They avoided admitting incomplete knowledge, explaining their
